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Presidential Immunity from Prosecution: 
Tolling the Statute of Limitations 
 
Margit Livingston* 
In 1998 Brett M. Kavanaugh, having recently left the position of 
associate counsel in the Office of the Whitewater Independent Coun-
sel, published a law review article in which he argued that sitting 
presidents cannot be indicted.1 He called for Congress to pass a stat-
ute making that prohibition explicit.2 But he also urged Congress to 
enact legislation tolling3 the statute of limitations during the period 
of a presidency for any offenses committed by the president against 
the United States.4 It is time for Congress to take Justice Kavanaugh 
up on his second recommendation. 
The Mueller Report did not exonerate President Donald Trump 
from having engaged in obstruction of justice before and during his 
presidency.5 Hence President Trump may or may not have commit-
 
* Vincent de Paul Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. I gratefully 
acknowledge the insightful comments of my colleagues Monu Bedi, Bruce Ottley, and Mark 
Weber. Special thanks to my friend Cherie Travis, who urged me to write this essay. 
 1.  Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 
2133, 2146 (1998). Brett Kavanaugh, of course, was confirmed as Associate Justice of the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court on October 6, 2018. Deanna Paul, With Kavanaugh Confirmed, Im-
peachment Could Follow. Here’s How, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2018, 2:11 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/04/if-kavanaugh-is-confirmed-
impeachment-could-follow-heres-how/. 
 2.  Kavanaugh, supra note 1, at 2146. 
 3.  Tolling means to stop or suspend the running of a limitations period.  Pearson Den-
tal Supplies, Inc. v. Superior Court, 229 P.3d 83, 88 (Cal. 2010); Castro v. Stanwood Sch. Dist. 
No. 401, 86 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Wash. 2004).  One court explained the concept as follows: “Toll-
ing may be analogized to a clock that is stopped and then restarted. Whatever period of time 
that remained when the clock is stopped is available when the clock is restarted, that is, when 
the tolling period has ended.”  Woods v. Young, 807 P.2d 455, 461 n.3 (Cal. 1991). 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  2 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE 
INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2 
(2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report_volume2.pdf (“The evidence we obtained about 
the President’s actions and intent presents difficult issues that prevent us from conclusively de-
termining that no criminal conduct occurred. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude 
that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him.”). 
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ted federal crimes.6 The statute of limitations for most federal crimi-
nal offenses is five years.7 If President Trump is re-elected in 20208 
and serves another full term, the five-year statute of limitations for 
federal crimes will have expired for acts committed in 2017 or earlier 
by the time that he leaves office in January 2025. 
Several authorities agree that a sitting president may not be in-
dicted, and that impeachment is the only remedy available if a presi-
dent has committed criminal acts in office.9 The Mueller Report itself 
emphasizes that it would be unfair for a prosecutor to bring even a 
sealed indictment against a sitting president or to suggest in an offi-
cial report that the president is guilty of criminal offenses.10 Thus, a 
president is immune from prosecution while in office and may go un-
punished for criminal offenses committed before or during his term 
because of the running of the statute of limitations. 
Arguably, no public official, even or especially the president, 
should be able to escape the consequences of his or her crimes—
particularly those that go to the heart of our rule of law and the in-
tegrity of our election system. In this case, President Trump may be 
completely innocent of any offense, including obstruction of justice. 
 
 6.  See Bret Stephens, Donald Trump’s High Crimes and Misdemeanors, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/opinion/donald-trump-cohen-
impeachment.html (discussing some of the possible federal crimes that President Trump has 
committed); Benjamin Wittes, Five Things I Learned from the Mueller Report: A Careful 
Reading of the Dense Document Delivers Some Urgent Insights, ATLANTIC (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/ben-wittes-five-conclusions-mueller-
report/588259/. 
 7.  18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2018). 
 8.  Although President Trump’s approval ratings are not strong, one recent analysis of 
his reelection prospects concluded that his “advantage in the Electoral College, relative to the 
national popular vote, may be even larger than it was in 2016.” Nate Cohn, Trump’s Electoral 
College Edge Could Grow in 2020, Rewarding Polarizing Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/upshot/trump-electoral-college-edge-.html (cit-
ing an Upshot analysis of election results and polling data). 
 9.  Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution, 2 
NEXUS J. OPINION 11, 11 (1997); Philip C. Bobbitt, Impeachment: A Handbook, 128 YALE 
L.J. F. 515, 564 (2018); Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Office 
of Legal Counsel, Amenability of the President, Vice President and Other Civil Officers to 
Federal Criminal Prosecution While in Office 16 (Sept. 24, 1973), https://fas.org/irp/agency/ 
doj/olc/092473.pdf; A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 
24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 236–37 (2000), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/626926/download. 
 10.  MUELLER, supra note 5, at 2 (“An individual who believes he was wrongly accused 
can use [the judicial] process to seek to clear his name. In contrast, a prosecutor’s judgment that 
crimes were committed, but that no charges will be brought, affords no such adversarial oppor-
tunity for public name-clearing before an impartial adjudicator.”). 
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But the criminal justice system should be permitted to function 
against him as it would against any other citizen. The maxim that no 
person is above the law should be more than a hollow promise. 
fK==pí~íìíÉë=çÑ=iáãáí~íáçåë=~åÇ=mçäáÅó=`çåëáÇÉê~íáçåë=
Statutes of limitations, which have existed for centuries in Anglo-
American law, restrict the time period during which a civil or crimi-
nal action may be brought.11 They serve three primary purposes in 
the criminal context: prevention of stale claims, repose within the jus-
tice system, and diligence in prosecution of claims.12 
First, statutes of limitation are designed to prevent the prosecu-
tion of stale claims where important evidence may have been lost.13 
Documents may be lost, and witnesses’ memories may fade with the 
passage of time. A defendant cannot mount a proper defense or re-
ceive a fair trial if evidence has disappeared or has been compro-
mised. 
The second purpose of limitation periods is to provide repose to 
defendants and to the court system.14 If the statute of limitations is 
unlimited, defendants never know when they will be free from civil 
suit or criminal indictment, and courts face the prospect of dealing 
with old cases that clutter the docket years after the claim accrued or 
the crime was committed. That said, some offenses, such as murder, 
are so heinous that in many jurisdictions, there is no statute of limita-
tions applicable to them.15 
Finally, the criminal limitations statutes encourage prosecutors to 
investigate suspected criminal activity diligently and bring charges 
promptly.16 Knowing that limitations periods will bar stale claims, 
 
 11.  See G. Robert Blakey, Time-Bars: Rico-Criminal and Civil-Federal and State, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1581, 1663–64 (2013) (noting that the first permanent English statute of 
limitations in civil actions dates from 1540 during the reign of Henry VIII). 
 12.  Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114–15 (1970). 
 13.  United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984); United States v. Barraza-Lopez, 
659 F.3d 1216, 1220–21 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 14.  United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 n.14 (1971); United States v. DeLia, 906 
F.3d 1212, 1217, 1222 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 15.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(a)(1) (2019); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.080 (2019); United States v. Gallaher, 624 F.3d 934, 940–41 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 16.  United States v. Kozeny, 541 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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prosecutors are encouraged to investigate possible offenses while the 
evidence is still fresh and witnesses’ memories sharp. 
In considering whether the five-year federal statute of limitations 
should be tolled with respect to possible crimes that a president 
commits before or after assuming office, one should balance the con-
cerns about stale claims and repose against the broader policy of ef-
fecting justice through holding individuals accountable for their 
crimes. Arguably, in President Trump’s case, because the Mueller in-
vestigation preserved many of the key documents and witness state-
ments related to a possible obstruction charge, the problem of miss-
ing or suspect evidence is reduced if not eliminated. Regarding 
repose, President Trump is hardly unaware of the investigation into 
his actions and his potential culpability for federal offenses. He must 
know that if he loses the 2020 presidential election, the five-year 
statute of limitations will not have run out, and he will be vulnerable 
to prosecution. The need to avoid stale claims and achieve repose 
theoretically will still be served in many instances involving presiden-
tial misconduct because of the high-profile nature of these cases. 
ffK==jÉÅÜ~åáëãë=Ñçê=qçääáåÖ=
Traditionally, federal statutes of limitations may be tolled in a va-
riety of ways, including special legislation, the use of a sealed indict-
ment, and the judicial application of equitable tolling. These mecha-
nisms reveal that tolling, while possible, is a relatively rare 
phenomenon. 
A.  Special Tolling Legislation 
Congress may pass a statute specifically tolling a statute of limita-
tions in certain circumstances. Congress has done so where there are 
certain impediments to the timely commencement of an action. 
There are numerous statutes of limitations that provide for tolling in 
various federal civil actions.17 
 
 17.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2018) (“The action of any person under legal disabil-
ity or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be commenced within three years after 
the disability ceases.”); Giel v. Winter, 503 F. Supp. 2d 208, 211 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing 50 
U.S.C. app. § 526(a) (“[T]he period of a service member’s military service may not be included 
in computing any period limited by law, regulation, or order for the bringing of any necessary 
action or proceeding in court.”)). 
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On the criminal side, Congress has enacted at least four laws toll-
ing a statute of limitations. Under the first, the statute will toll when 
a court dismisses an indictment brought within the applicable limita-
tions period.18 If the dismissal occurs after the statute has expired, the 
prosecutor has six months from the date of the dismissal in which to 
bring the indictment again.19 Congress created this tolling provision 
to allow prosecutors to refile indictments where a court has dismissed 
them on technical grounds.20 In other words, rather than allow a de-
fendant to escape justice because of a technical error in the initial in-
dictment, Congress permits prosecutors to file an amended indict-
ment within a relatively short period of time. 
Under the second tolling statute, Congress tolls the statute of 
limitations where the putative defendant is “fleeing from justice.”21 
The obvious purpose here is to prevent criminal suspects from avoid-
ing prosecution by absenting themselves from the country or going 
into hiding. Suspects cannot evade the limitations period by remain-
ing unreachable until that period has expired.22 
The third tolling statute allows a district court to suspend the 
running of the limitations period when evidence of a crime reasona-
bly appears to be in a foreign country.23 The prosecutor applying for 
the suspension must show that an official request for the evidence has 
been made to the appropriate foreign authority.24 Suspensions al-
lowed under this provision cannot exceed three years.25 Through this 
tolling provision, Congress recognizes that a prosecutor’s collection 
of evidence in a foreign country may be arduous and time-
consuming. Because of those difficulties, federal prosecutors should 
have extra time to procure the necessary evidence from overseas. 
 
 18.  18 U.S.C. § 3288 (2018). 
 19.  Id.; United States v. Shipsey, 363 F.3d 962, 970–71 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 20.  United States v. Hill, 494 F. Supp. 571, 580 (S.D. Fla. 1980). 
 21.  18 U.S.C. § 3290 (2018). 
 22.  Under this tolling provision, the government must prove that the defendant inten-
tionally fled or remained concealed to avoid prosecution. United States v. Greever, 134 F.3d 
777, 780 (6th Cir. 1998). The defendant’s intent to evade prosecution “can be inferred from the 
defendant’s knowledge that he was wanted and his subsequent failure to submit to an arrest.” 
Id. 
 23.  18 U.S.C. § 3292 (2018). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
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Under a fourth federal tolling provision, Congress has suspended 
the statute of limitations for pecuniary crimes committed against the 
United States during wartime.26 The limitations period does not run 
until “[five] years after the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by 
a Presidential proclamation, with notice to Congress, or by a concur-
rent resolution of Congress.”27 This law acknowledges the opportuni-
ty for fraud in government contracts executed hastily while the Unit-
ed States is at war, as well as the difficulty of prosecuting fraudfeasors 
while the conflict is ongoing.28 
Congress has exercised its power to curtail the statute of limita-
tions for federal crimes in the instances outlined above, thus ac-
knowledging that it is appropriate to extend the limitations period in 
certain circumstances: where a defendant is in hiding, where war pre-
vents prompt prosecution of pecuniary crimes against the govern-
ment, and where evidence is difficult to obtain. These circumstances 
arguably are present in any situation in which a sitting president is 
suspected of having committed federal offenses either before or after 
he assumed office. If a sitting president cannot be indicted, he or she 
is essentially unavailable for prosecution, like a defendant in hiding. 
The term of the presidency is analogous to a wartime situation where 
the government is unable as a practical matter to indict and try a de-
fendant without interfering with the conduct of the government. And 
if a sitting president cannot be subpoenaed, then crucial evidence will 
be unavailable until after the president leaves office. These analogies 
should spur Congress to enact a law that tolls the statute of limita-
tions for federal crimes while the president is in office. 
B.  Use of a Sealed Indictment 
Another mechanism for tolling the criminal statute of limitations 
is the use of a sealed indictment. Once a prosecutor brings such an 
indictment, the statute of limitations tolls at that point.29 But the 
 
 26.  18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2018). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 218–19 (1953). The suspension provision 
applies only to criminal offenses and not civil fraud claims. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. 
v. United States ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1978 (2015). 
 29.  Federal district courts have broad discretion to seal an indictment “when it is in the 
public interest or serves a legitimate law-enforcement purpose.” United States v. Ellis, 622 F.3d 
784, 792 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Wright, 343 F.3d 849, 857 (6th Cir. 2003); United 
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same authorities asserting that the United States Attorney cannot in-
dict a sitting president also state unequivocally that sealed indict-
ments are forbidden as well.30 Accepting that premise, the federal 
prosecutor must seek other methods to toll the five-year criminal 
statute of limitations. 
C.  The Judicial Doctrine of Equitable Tolling 
In addition to the mechanisms described above, federal courts 
have sometimes used the doctrine of equitable tolling to extend the 
limitations period. Federal civil statutes of limitations may be tolled 
for equitable reasons, such as government misconduct or deception, 
as long as the plaintiffs pursued their claims with reasonable dili-
gence.31 In these cases, courts have said that the statute of limitations 
should be tolled “as a matter of fairness.”32 
Criminal statutes of limitations, however, are rarely tolled in this 
way,33 and the standard for the application of equitable tolling is 
vague. The presumption is in favor of repose—that is, if the prosecu-
tor has filed charges after the limitations period has run out and the 
defendant escapes justice, that result is unfortunate but inevitable.34 
Apart from the defendant’s “intentional inducement or trickery,” a 
federal court will toll a criminal statute of limitations only in “the ra-
re situation where equitable tolling is demanded by sound legal prin-
ciples as well as the interest of justice.”35 
In connection with federal criminal cases, equitable tolling arises 
most commonly where an incarcerated defendant files a petition for 
habeas corpus. In those situations, courts will apply equitable tolling 
 
States v. Thompson, 287 F.3d 1244, 1251 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Sharpe, 995 F.2d 
49, 50 (5th Cir. 1993).  
 30.  MUELLER, supra note 5, at 2. 
 31.  United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 411–12 (2015); Land Grantors in 
Henderson v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 661, 713 (2005). 
 32.  Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 33.  See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 396 (2007) ("Equitable tolling is a rare remedy 
to be applied in unusual circumstances, not a cure-all for an entirely common state of affairs."); 
Gardner v. Davis, No. 4:19-2185, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53457, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 
2020) (“Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy which is sparingly applied.”); Binkley v. 
Ryan, No. CV 18-08243 PCT DLR (CDB), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229434, at *7 (D. Ariz. 
Apr. 29, 2019) (“Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted.”).  
 34.  Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970); United States v. Miller, 911 
F.3d 638, 645 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v. Grimmett, 236 F.3d 452, 456 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 35.  United States v. Atiyeh, 402 F.3d 354, 367 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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only when defendants show they pursued their rights with reasonable 
diligence, and “extraordinary circumstances” prevented them for as-
serting those rights.36 To prove extraordinary circumstances, a habeas 
petitioner must establish “either that he has been actively misled, that 
he was prevented from asserting his rights in some extraordinary way, 
that he timely asserted his rights in the wrong forum, or that the 
court misled him regarding the steps he needed to take to preserve 
his claim.”37 
Beyond the factors enumerated in habeas cases, federal courts 
have provided little guidance as to what constitutes “sound legal prin-
ciples" and the "interest[s] of justice”38 sufficient to warrant equitable 
tolling of the limitations period for criminal prosecutions. It is uncer-
tain, therefore, whether a court would apply the equitable tolling 
doctrine to the prosecution of a former president if the five-year stat-
ute of limitations had expired. Certainly, the federal prosecutor could 
argue that the inability of the U.S. Attorney to indict a sitting presi-
dent constitutes extraordinary circumstances, given the extreme rarity 
with which that situation would arise. In addition, the interests of jus-
tice arguably dictate that a former president who has potentially vio-
lated federal criminal laws, particularly those that pertain to the in-
tegrity of the election process, face appropriate charges. Possible 
prejudice to the defendant is less evident because a president will of-
ten know that such charges are a possibility, and much of the relevant 
evidence will already have been preserved. 
Arguably then, a court might have grounds to apply equitable 
tolling to criminal charges brought against a president after he or she 
leaves office. But that path is highly uncertain. Precedent overwhelm-
ingly leans against equitable tolling of criminal statutes of limitations. 
It would take a courageous and resolute judge to apply equitable toll-
ing against a former president facing criminal indictment several 
years from now. Of course, the constitutional remedy of impeach-
ment is available if Congress believes that the president has commit-
 
 36.  Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). 
 37.  Mitchell v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., No. 16-0532(MCA), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10695, 
at *13 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2019). 
 38.  For cases referring to these concepts generally, see United States v. Atiyeh, 402 F.3d 
354, 367 (3d Cir. 2005); Cooper v. Ferguson, No. 19-cv-4030, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41445, 
at *26 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2020); Bussanich v. Adult Video Only, Inc., No. C16-5231RBL, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119344, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sep. 2, 2016). 
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ted high crimes and misdemeanors. But that remedy is arduous, polit-
ically charged, and potentially divisive of the country in the ex-
treme.39 As recent events show, it is highly unlikely that a president 
would be removed from office by impeachment where his or her par-
ty controls the Senate, the body that conducts the impeachment tri-
al.40 
fffK==`çåÅäìëáçå=
Thus, as Justice Kavanaugh asserted over twenty years ago, Con-
gress should pass a law expressly tolling the statute of limitations for 
federal crimes where indictment has been delayed because the de-
fendant is a sitting president. Though this proposed law might readi-
ly pass the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, it con-
cededly might fail in the Republican-controlled Senate. Even if such 
legislation did pass the Senate, no doubt the President would veto it, 
and Congress could only overrule the veto through a two-thirds ma-
jority of each chamber.41 In the face of a presidential veto, Congress 
should muster the courage to implement Justice Kavanaugh’s pro-
posal and toll the limitations period for federal offenses while the 
president is in office. In addition, a veto would highlight the presi-
dent’s resistance to being subject to the same laws as other public of-
ficials, and citizens could consider that resistance in determining 
whether to vote for reelection. 
No president should be allowed to manipulate the election pro-
cess or shield those who have done so by obstructing justice. 
Through that kind of manipulation, a president could gain the ad-
 
39. Even after Robert Mueller’s testimony before Congress in July 2019, House Demo-
crats remained divided over whether to bring impeachment proceedings against President 
Trump. Nicholas Fandos et al., Mueller Testimony Deepens Democratic Divide on Impeach-
ment, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 26, 2019, at A1 (“The majority of the Democratic caucus remains skep-
tical about what it sees as a politically perilous push that would lead to an almost certain acquit-
tal in the Senate and further drain attention from its legislative work.”). 
40. On Feb. 5, 2020, the U.S. Senate acquitted President Trump of the two charges 
brought against him by the U.S. House of Representatives—abuse of power and obstruction of 
Congress. The vote on obstruction of Congress was strictly along party lines; the second vote 
saw one Republican senator crossing party lines to vote to convict on the charge of abuse of 
power.  Peter Baker, Impeachment Trial Updates: Senate Acquits Trump, Ending Historic 
Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/impeach-
ment -vote.html.  
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
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vantage of incumbency and thus a smoother path to a second term 
that would thereby put him or her beyond the reach of criminal pros-
ecution. A law tolling the statute of limitations during a president’s 
term of office would encourage the president and his or her associates 
to adhere to the legal norms that undergird our democracy. 
 
